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Introduction
Becker (1973, 1974) convincingly argued that the institution of marriage can be analyzed by means of modern microeconomic theory. In his ground-breaking work, as well as in subsequent work by Becker, Landes and Michael (1977) , the concept of the marriage market is introduced, which rests on the simple but powerful assumption that individuals are rational utility maximizers who compete as they seek mates. Such a framework implies that each individual looks for the best mate subject to the restrictions imposed by the marriage market. An important concept in this theory is gains to marriage, which depend on the particular union as well as on the opportunities implied by the marriage market as a whole.
The gains to marriage do not only consist of companionship and the production and rearing of children. There are also considerable economic gains, such as the sharing of public goods or the division of labour within unions (see Browning, Chiappori and Weiss, 2014 , for an extensive discussion). The economic gains to marriage play a crucial role in the recent model proposed by Cherchye, Demuynck, De Rock and Vermeulen (2015) to analyze the impact of the marriage market on the intrahousehold distribution of resources. In their model, the collective model (Chiappori, 1988 (Chiappori, , 1992 is combined with the assumption of a stable marriage market, a concept that is directly related to the ideas in Becker (1973 Becker ( , 1974 and Becker, Landes and Michael (1977) . The model predicts that the more attractive the outside options of a spouse, the higher is his or her share of the household's resources. These outside options improve with one's productivity, which implies that the marriage market can explain the widely observed positive relationship between wages and the share of household resources consumed (see, e.g., Blundell In this paper, we argue that the economic aspects of marriage and divorce may be even more salient in developing countries. As a consequence, we focus on the estimation of the gains to marriage and divorce in Malawi, which is one of the poorest countries in the world. Given the importance of agricultural production in this setting, we extend the theoretical model in Cherchye, Demuynck, De Rock and Vermulen (2015) to include production. Appealingly, we can do this while allowing for both heterogeneous individual preferences and household production technologies. We estimate this model on panel data drawn from the Malawi Integrated Household Survey (IHS), and we test whether model-based measures of marital instability predict future divorces. As we discuss in more detail in Section 3.1, Malawi is an attractive setting for the estimation of this model because it has one of the highest divorce rates in Africa. 1 Reniers (2003) shows that in Malawi lifetime divorce probabilities are between 40% and 65%. He also shows that remarriage is almost universal: within two years of divorce, over 40% of women have remarried in the sample, and this …gure reaches almost 90% after ten years. Thus, divorce and remarriage is a realistic outside option for married individuals.
Our model yields two structural indices for marriage instability: the …rst index captures how much better o¤ (in consumption terms) the individual would be if single (the Individual Rationality (IR) index), while the second index measures how much better o¤ the individual would be if (s)he remarried another individual in the same marriage market (the Blocking Pair (BP) index). In the empirical analysis, we compute these instability indices for each married individual in the 2010 wave of our data. We then link these measures of instability to observed divorces between the 2010 and 2013 waves of the IHS. This sheds light on the importance of economic gains to marriage and divorce and how well our model is able to predict divorces and subsequent remarriages.
Our empirical results demonstrate that the wife's BP index signi…cantly predicts divorce in the panel. A one-percentage-point increase in the wife's BP index, as a proportion of her household's income, raises the probability of divorce by 0:6 percentage points on average. This is a nonnegligible e¤ect, as the proportions of currently divorced and married individuals in the population suggest an annual divorce probability of 8:5%. 2 Therefore, we …nd that a model-based predictor of divorce correlates with out-of-sample realizations of divorce, hence validating the structural model. Interestingly, this signi…cant association cannot be explained by spouses'wages, land income or nonlabour income which, alongside intrahousehold sharing, are the key determinants of the BP index in the structural model. This suggests that intrahousehold sharing e¤ectively plays an important role in the gains to marriage and divorce. As an extension to these results, we also estimate a multinomial model that di¤erentiates between individuals who divorce and remain single, and those who divorce and remarry. Interestingly, we …nd that the wife's BP index is signi…cantly associated with the wife divorcing and remarrying, but not divorcing and remaining single. This is consistent with the idea that the BP index captures the attractiveness of remarriage.
Our paper makes two contributions to the literature. First, from a methodological point of view, it extends the model of Cherchye, Demuynck, De Rock and Vermeulen (2015) to account for domestic production in modeling households'economic behavior. This is particularly relevant for households in developing countries, for which agricultural production activities are prevalent.
Interestingly, this also allows us to estimate shadow wages and land prices, which are often missing or su¤er from measurement error in empirical applications. A distinguishing feature of our method is that it belongs to a revealed preference tradition that is free of any parametric assumptions, and thus obtains robust conclusions. See Samuelson (1938) , Afriat (1967) , Diewert (1973) and Varian (1982) for early contributions on revealed preference analysis of household consumption behavior.
More recently, Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2007, 2009, 2011) have extended this seminal work towards the analysis of collective households.
Second, our empirical application o¤ers a novel perspective on the growing literature on the economic drivers of divorce. This literature has focused on the relationship between economic shocks and divorce. For example, Weiss and Willis (1997) …nd that shocks to husbands' earning capacity reduce the probability of divorce, while shocks to wives'earning capacity increase it. In a similar vein, Boheim and Ermisch (2001) …nd that positive economic surprises among British households reduce the probability of union dissolution. Charles and Stephens (2004) compare the e¤ect of spousal job loss and spousal disability, and …nd that job loss raises the probability of divorce but disability does not. Other papers examine the e¤ect of lottery winnings on divorce (Hankins and Hoekstra, 2011) and the relationship between house prices and divorce (Farnham, Schmidt and Sevak, 2011 ). An alternative way to model observed patterns of cohabitation, marriage and divorce is proposed by Brien, Lillard and Stern (2006) , who model match quality as an experience good, à la Jovanovic's (1979) labour market matching model. Overall, the evidence suggests that there is an important economic component to divorce, although these studies do not consider the potential for remarriage, and except for Brien, Lillard and Stern (2006) , do not implement a structural measure of the economic gains to divorce. As explained above, our structural approach combines the collective consumption model with the assumption of marriage stability, which allows us to explicitly incorporate the importance of intrahousehold sharing and options on the marriage market in the analysis of marriage and divorce decisions.
The rest of this paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 introduces our revealed preference methodology for analysing stability of marriage. Here, we also de…ne our IR and BP indices for marriage stability. In Section 3 we provide further motivation for our empirical research question by explaining the speci…c setting of Malawi. We also present our sample of households and the construction of the marriage markets used in our empirical application. Section 4 presents some summary statistics on the main outcomes of our structural model. These results will motivate our regression analyses in Section 5, in which we focus on the relationship between the economic gains to divorce (captured by our IR and BP indices) and divorce and remarriage probabilities. Section 6 concludes. The Appendix gives additional details on our data construction method.
Consumption, production and marriage stability
Our method for measuring instability of marriage builds on a recent paper by Cherchye, Demuynck, De Rock and Vermeulen (2015). These authors de…ned a revealed preference characterization of household consumption under stable marriage to analyze the intrahousehold allocation of resources.
A novel feature of our analysis is that we integrate agricultural production in this revealed preference framework, thus linking productivity to marriage decisions. As we will explain further on (in Section 3.1), agricultural production is an important dimension of household decision behavior in Malawi.
It is the primary source of livelihood and a crucial determinant of outside options. Moreover, our structural modeling of household production allows us to use shadow wages and land prices in our analysis of marriage stability. This is particularly convenient in view of our empirical application, because fully reliable wage and land price information is not available for the Malawian households that we study. As this last feature is often characteristic to data sets on developing countries, this also indicates the usefulness of our model in other application settings. 4 
Notation and components of the structural model
We focus on the marriage stability of couples that consist of a female a and a male b. In what follows, we will often refer to individual i = a; b. Let A be a …nite set of females and B a …nite set of males. The marriage market is de…ned by a matching function : and (b) = a). In this methodological section we will assume that jAj = jBj, which means that all individuals are matched. In contrast, in the empirical part of this paper we will account for the possibility that jAj 6 = jBj and that a married individual may consider remarrying a single of the other gender. Actually, if we do not include rationalizability conditions for singles' behavior, it is relatively straightforward to formally include this possibility in the models below. 3 However, unless there is a shortage on one side of the marriage market, rationalizing the behavior of singles requires an explicit model for frictions on the marriage market and/or marriage costs. To focus our discussion, we abstract from such extensions in the current study.
Each individual i is assumed to spend her or his total time endowment (denoted by T i 2 R + ) on leisure (l i 2 R + ), market work (m i 2 R + ) and agricultural work on the household's land (denoted by h i 2 R + ). The individual time budget constraint thus equals:
The price of time is individual i's wage, which we represent by w i 2 R ++ :
To model agricultural production, we assume that there are three types of inputs: the individuals'time spent on agricultural labour (h a and h b ), land (L 2 R + ) and other input (x 2 R + ; e.g. fertilizer). We distinguish between land of the female (L a 2 R + ), land of the male (L b 2 R + ) and
For a given match (a; b), we assume a common price for the three land types, i.e. the price of L a , L b and L (a;b) is given by z (a;b) 2 R ++ . Other input x is assumed to be a Hicksian aggregate with a price that is normalized to unity. The inputs are transformed into an output y 2 R + by means of an agricultural production function F h a ; h (a) ; L; x . We assume that this function is increasing in its arguments and characterized by constant returns to scale (in line with Pollak and Wachter, 1975) . The output associated with agricultural production is again a Hicksian aggregate, with a price that is normalized at unity. The household is further associated with a nonlabour income n (a;b) 2 R + .
The total income of a household consists of income from market work, agricultural production and nonlabour income. It is allocated to a Hicksian aggregate good with a price that is normalized to unity. This Hicksian aggregate is used for the private consumption of both spouses (denoted by q a and q b 2 R + ) and the household's expenditures on a public good (denoted by Q 2 R + ).
Examples of private goods are expenditures on food and clothing, while an example of a public good is expenditure on children.
Finally, each individual i is assumed to derive utility from leisure, private consumption as well as public consumption. The preferences of individual i are represented by a utility function U i l i ,q i ; Q that is assumed to be continuous, concave and strictly increasing in leisure l i and private consumption q i , and increasing in public consumption Q.
Marriage stability: theoretical characterization
Let us now de…ne a stable marriage allocation. We will say that an allocation is stable if it satis…es three equilibrium conditions. First, at the consumption level, we adopt the collective approach of Chiappori (1988 Chiappori ( , 1992 and assume that within-household allocations are Pareto e¢ cient. Formally, this means that every matched couple (a; (a)) chooses a consumption allocation that solves max l a ;l (a) ;qa;q (a) ;Q U a (l a ; q a ; Q) + U (a) l (a) ; q (a) ; Q (1)
where represents the Pareto weight of male (a) relative to female a, and N = n + x + zL. We note that the Pareto weights are in general not constant. They will vary with factors such as wages.
Next, we remark that N contains nonlabour income n as well as the rental value of land (quantities L a , L b and L (a;b) , which are evaluated at the prices z (a;b) for each match (a; b)) and the cost for the other input x. In terms of the household's budget equation in (1) , note that the total private consumption on the left-hand side of the budget equation contains both market consumption and agricultural output. Therefore we need to add the cost needed to produce this output to the righthand side as well. These expenditures are, of course, equal to the expenses on the inputs needed to produce the speci…c output. The optimal composition of the inputs and the size of the agricultural output is determined next.
Second, at the production level, we follow the set-up of Chiappori (1997) 
where U a S and U b S denote the female's and male's maximum attainable utilities as singles, respectively. Intuitively, Individual Rationality imposes that no female or male wants to exit the marriage and become single.
Next, to formalize the condition of No Blocking Pair, we let U a P (a;b) and U b P (a;b) represent any possible realization of utilities for female a and male b if they formed a pair. Then, the No Blocking Pair requirement imposes that
In words, a marriage allocation has no blocking pairs if no female a and male b are both better o¤, with at least one individual strictly better o¤, by remarrying each other instead of staying with their current partner.
In what follows, we will quantify deviations from the Individual Rationality and No Blocking Pair conditions by Individual Rationality (IR) and Blocking Pair (BP ) indices, which measure the degree of marriage instability. We will compute these indices under the maintained assumptions that intrahousehold consumption allocations are Pareto e¢ cient and production allocations are pro…t e¢ cient.
Marriage stability: empirical conditions
For a given marriage market, the data set D contains the following information: As is standardly assumed for household data, we remark that the set D does not include information on individuals'private consumption; only the aggregate household quantities q (a; (a)) are observed. The individuals' private quantities will be treated as unknowns in our empirical conditions for marriage stability. 4 Next, in what follows we will assume that wages and land prices remain the same when individuals exit marriage (and become single or remarry), i.e. divorce has no productivity e¤ects. For the moment, we assume that these prices and wages are perfectly observed. We will relax this assumption later on (see Section 2.4).
Characterizing stable marriage As explained in Section 2.2, we say that the data set D is consistent with a stable matching if it allows the speci…cation of individual utility functions U a and U b that represent the observed consumption behavior as Pareto e¢ cient and the observed marriages as stable. We use revealed preference conditions that are intrinsically nonparametric, in the sense that they do not require an explicit (parametric) speci…cation of the functions U a and b. and, for each pair
4 In our empirical application, part of the private consumption will be assignable to men and women (i.e. individual expenditures on health, education and clothing; see the Appendix). Such information is easy to include in the linear conditions in Proposition 1. Basically, it implies lower bound restrictions on the unknowns q . For ease of notation, we will not explicitly consider this re…nement here. 5 After suitably adapting the notation of Cherchye, Demuynck, De Rock and Vermeulen (2015), the proof of Proposition 1 proceeds similarly as the proof of these authors'Proposition 2. Given this analogy, and for compactness, we do not explicitly include a formal proof in the current paper. Evidently, the proof can be obtained upon request.
such that the following constraints are met:
i. individual rationality restrictions for all females a 2 A and males b 2 B, i.e. N a + z (a; (a)) L a + w a T a w a l a + q (a; (a)) a + Q (a; (a)) ,
ii. no blocking pair restrictions for all a 2 A and b 2 B, i.e.
Thus, consistency of D with a stable matching requires that it is possible to specify individual quantities q (a; (a)) a ; q (a; (a)) (a) and personalized prices P
that satisfy a set of constraints that are linear in these unknown quantities and prices. Therefore a convenient feature of the conditions in Proposition 1 is that they can be checked through simple linear programming, which means that they are easy to apply in practice. Also note that the observability of individual land constitutes a natural lower bound in conditions (5) and (6).
We refer to Cherchye, Demuynck, De Rock and Vermeulen (2015) for a detailed explanation of Proposition 1. Here, we highlight the "revealed preference" interpretation of the conditions (i) and (ii) in terms of stable marriage allocation. First, the inequalities (5) in condition (i) require, for each individual male and female, that the budget conditions under single status (with income N a + z (a; (a)) L a + w a T a for female a and
do not allow buying a bundle that is strictly more expensive than the one consumed under the current marriage (i.e. l a ; q (a; (a)) a ; Q (a; (a)) for female a and l b ; q
is not met, then at least one man or woman is better o¤ (i.e. can attain a strictly better bundle) as a single, which means that the marriage allocation is not stable.
In a similar vein, the right hand side of the inequality (6) in condition (ii) gives the sum value of the bundles within marriage for female a (i.e. w a l a + q (a; (a)) a + P (a;b) a Q (a; (a)) ) and male b (i.e.
), evaluated at the prices that pertain to the pair (a; b) (and using the personalized prices P to evaluate the public quantities). The inequality then requires that the pair's total income (i.e.
not exceed this sum value. Intuitively, if this condition is not met, then woman a and man b can allocate their income so that both of them are better o¤ (with at least one strictly better o¤) than with their current matches (a) and (b), which makes (a; b) a blocking pair.
Quantifying marriage instability An important focus of our empirical analysis will be on marriage instability. As explained before, we quantify marital instability in terms of individuals' consumption gains from divorcing and remaining single or remarrying. More speci…cally, we use our model to de…ne two structural measures of instability: our Individual Rationality (IR) indices capture how much better o¤ (in consumption terms) individuals would be as a single person, and our Blocking Pair (BP ) indices measure how much better o¤ individuals would be when remarrying other partners in the same marriage market.
To operationalize these ideas, for each exit option from marriage (i.e. become single or remarry another potential partner), we quantify the minimal within-marriage consumption increase that is needed to represent the observed marriage as stable with respect to the given exit option (as characterized by the conditions (i) and (ii) in Proposition 1). This indicates how far the observed behavior (with the original income levels) is from stable behavior. Conversely, it measures the possible gain from divorce when choosing a particular exit option and, therefore, we can interpret it as revealing the degree of marriage instability.
Formally, starting from our characterization in Proposition 1, we include an instability index in each restriction of individual rationality (s IR a;; for the female a and s IR ;;b for the male b) and no blocking pair (s BP a;b for the pair (a; b)). We replace the inequalities in (5) by
and the inequality (6) by 
subject to the feasibility constraints (a) and (b) in Proposition 1 and the linear constraints (7) and (8) . By solving (9), we compute IR indices for the individual rationality constraints (s IR a;; and s IR ;;b in (7)) and BP indices for the no blocking pair constraints (s BP m;w in (8)). Correspondingly, for each exit option, we can de…ne an associated gain from divorce. In our application, we will de…ne "relative" divorce gains by setting out these gains as proportions of the household's income:
Shadow wages and land prices
So far we have assumed that prices are observed. If prices are not observed, we can use shadow prices. To do so, we can use the structural model that we de…ned in Section 2.2, which assumes pro…t e¢ cient behavior under constant returns to scale (see (2)). In the spirit of Proposition 1, we use a characterization of pro…t e¢ ciency that is nonparametric, which here means that it does not require an explicit speci…cation of the production technology (represented by the function F ). 6 Let the true wages (w i for each individual i = a; b) and land prices (z (a; (a)) for each matched pair (a; (a))) be unobserved. Then, we can de…ne shadow wages and prices under the identifying assumption of pro…t e¢ cient production behavior. Speci…cally, we say that the data set D is consistent with shadow pro…t maximization if we can specify a production function F such that pro…t e¢ ciency of the observed production behavior is supported by shadow prices. Adapting the notation in Varian (1984, Theorem 6) to our setting, we obtain the following characterization of productive e¢ cient behavior. i such that, for all a 0 2 A,
Basically, the conditions (10) and (11) require that there exist shadow prices such that the observed input-output combination of each matched pair (a; (a)) achieves a pro…t of zero (see (10) ), which must exceed the pro…t for any household (a 0 ; (a 0 )) (with a 0 2 A) under the same prices (see (11) ): This condition of zero maximum pro…t directly follows from our constant returns to scale assumption. We append these pro…t e¢ ciency restrictions to the stability conditions above.
As a result, our marriage stability analysis will use shadow wages and land prices that are identi…ed under the assumption of e¢ cient household production. See also the linear program that we present below (in (14)).
Our empirical analysis will make use of two extensions of the characterization in Proposition 2. First, the characterization only imposes that shadow prices should be non-negative. Obviously, this allows for shadow prices that are unrealistic proxies of the true (unobserved) prices (e.g. prices that are in…nitely high). To exclude such unrealistic scenarios, we impose lower and upper bounds on possible prices. Speci…cally, we append the restrictions w a w a w a , w b w b w b and z (a; (a)) z (a; (a)) z (a; (a)) ;
for w a , w b , z (a; (a)) 2 R ++ and w a , w b , z (a; (a)) 2 R ++ prede…ned lower and upper bounds. The
Appendix explains how we de…ne these bounds in our empirical application.
Our second extension pertains to the fact that the characterization in Proposition 2 implicitly assumes that di¤erent households are characterized by homogeneous production technologies.
Clearly, in practice we need to account for unobserved technological heterogeneity across households, i.e. some households have access to less e¢ cient production technologies than others. To account for this heterogeneity, we introduce deviational variables a+ , a , a;a 0 2 R + for each matched pair (a; (a)). These variables capture possible deviations from the original (sharp) conditions in Proposition 2, which can thus be explained by heterogeneous technologies characterizing the di¤erent production processes. 7 Formally, in our pro…t e¢ ciency characterization in Proposition 2, we replace the equality 
Basically, the variables a+ , a , a;a 0 account for deviations from the zero maximum pro…t that appears at the left hand side in the original conditions (10) and (11) 
subject to the constraints (a) and (b) in Proposition 1, the stability constraints (7) and (8) and the pro…t e¢ ciency constraints (12) and (13) . Because all constraints are linear in unknowns, we can compute the solution values of s IR a;; , s IR ;;b , s BP a;b , a+ , a and a;a 0 by simple linear programming. In (14) , the parameter is a tuning parameter that represents the "penalization" weight of the marriage instability indices relative to the technological heterogeneity variables. As we use pro…t e¢ ciency as our identifying assumption for the shadow wages and land prices, we set very small. This can be interpreted in terms of a two-stage optimization process: in the …rst stage, we de…ne shadow prices as the prices that correspond to minimal deviations from our pro…t ine¢ ciency conditions (measured by P a a+ + a + P a 0 a;a 0 ); in the second stage, we compute instability indices for the given shadow prices (by minimizing P a s IR a;; +
Malawian households: setting, data and marriage markets
We start by sketching the speci…c context of Malawi. This will show that this country provides an interesting setting to investigate our question regarding the impact of economic determinants on marriage and divorce decisions. In a following step, we discuss our data selection and the construction of households'marriage markets. Individuals'key assets and thus outside options, here de…ned as utility on divorce, are their land-13 holdings and capacity for labour supply. Land is largely passed on through inheritance, often at the time of marriage (Telalagic, 2015b) . All this makes it clearly plausible that spouses divorce for economic reasons.
The Malawi setting
There are two key reasons why we choose this context to examine the role of economic factors in divorce. First, Malawi is characterized by high divorce rates. Marriage is almost universal (Reniers, 2003) , with over 99% of women and 97% of men having married at least once by the age of 30
(Demographic Health Survey Report, 2004). Early marriage is common, with the median age of …rst marriage at 18 for women and 23 for men (DHS Report, 2004); however, marriage is also unstable, with almost half of all marriages ending within twenty years, a much higher …gure than in other African countries (Reniers, 2003) . Women are more likely to be divorced, separated or widowed than men (DHS Report, 2004), and marriage may be terminated either through a court decree or by the death of a spouse. This decree is relatively easy to obtain, as the spouse seeking divorce need only show that there is no love remaining in the marriage (Mwambene, 2005) . Remarriage is also common, with 40% of women remarrying within two years. Thus, Malawi is characterized by an ease of moving between marriage and divorce, and thus a high turnover of divorces and remarriages, making it an appropriate setting for the model presented in Section 2, which assumes no frictions on the marriage market and remarriage or being single as realistic outside options.
Second, marriage is local. Approximately 45% of married individuals are from the village they live in, while a further 25% are from another village within the same district (Malawi IHS 2010, authors' calculations). This allows us to be precise about de…ning the marriage markets within which divorced individuals can look for potential remarriage partners.
Household data and marriage markets
Our data are drawn from the third Malawi Integrated Household Survey (IHS). We use the baseline survey conducted in 2010 and the second wave in 2013, where approximately one quarter of households were re-interviewed. These households were chosen randomly, and both the baseline sample and the panel subsample were designed to be nationally representative of the population of Malawi. In the baseline survey, 768 communities were selected based on probability proportional to size, and within those 16 households were randomly sampled. The sample we use is restricted to rural households who report that they engage in agriculture. 8 We only include monogamous households where at least one spouse reports non-zero hours of agricultural labour in the past
year. This produces a sample of 8624 married and single households. As explained above, we allow singles to form potential blocking pairs with married individuals. We obtain instability indices for 5924 married households, of which we observe 1404 households in the second wave. The Appendix discusses in more detail how the data for the estimation and empirical analysis were constructed.
A crucial component of our analysis is the de…nition of the marriage market, within which individuals can form potential blocking pairs. In Malawi, marriages tend to be local. In the IHS data set, approximately 45% of married individuals are from the village they live in, while a further 25% are from another village within the same district. We use this fact to guide our de…nition of the marriage market. In particular, we use the GPS coordinates provided in the IHS data to construct clusters of two to three geographically close villages. We use the k-means algorithm in Matlab, which partitions the data into k clusters using the squared Euclidean distance. We set the number of clusters to 300, so that the number of households per cluster ranges from 5 to 58, with the average number of households per cluster at 33.5. The more individuals there are in the marriage market, the more likely that there is a pro…table new match. Thus, the size of the cluster can a¤ect the values of instability. As a result, we control for the size of the cluster in our main analysis of divorce. 4 Outcomes of the structural model Table 2 summarizes some of the outputs of our structural model. We …nd that, on average, women have a signi…cantly lower shadow wage than men, which is consistent with observed wages in Malawi.
Women also have approximately one half of the land income of men, on average, which is partly driven by the fact that the average woman owns less land than the average man. However, women have signi…cantly higher non-labour income than men. In our model, non-labour income captures the di¤erence between consumption and agricultural income. High non-labour income is driven by low agricultural production, which in turn is driven by high hours of leisure in the sample. Similarly, we also express the Individual Rationality (IR) indices as a percentage of the household's total income. Table 3 presents the summary statistics of these variables. Some interesting observations emerge. First, the estimated instability from potential blocking pairs shows that about 65% average, women gain more by choosing the most attractive remarriage option than men. However, our BPavg results reveal that women's gains from selecting the "average" remarriage possibility are generally lower than men's gains. These results suggest that women have many unattractive potential matches and some very attractive potential matches, while men have mostly mediocre, somewhat attractive potential matches.
There are two ways of interpreting these …ndings. First, one can assume that the marriage market is frictionless, in the sense that any pro…table opportunities are exploited. The model predicts that almost half of the men in our sample would like to be single and more than half of women have pro…table remarriage opportunities. However, given that the market is frictionless, the model must be omitting unobserved costs of being single for men and remarriage for women. For men, there may be an unobserved bene…t to being married, such as the domestic labour of their wives. For women, there may be an unobserved cost of divorcing and remarrying, such as social stigma.
Second, one can assume that the marriage market has frictions and exploiting pro…table opportunities takes time. In this case, the model predicts that many men in our sample will divorce to become single in the future, while many women will divorce and remarry. On the other hand, few women will choose to divorce and remain single, while few men will divorce and remarry. This is at odds with the prevalence of single-headed female households in Malawi. In what follows, we will shed more light on which of these two explanations is more likely by examining in more detail the changes in marital status between 2010 and 2013.
At this point, we note that the absence of domestic labour in the model and data can explain the fact that no woman would prefer to be single. As virtually all domestic labour in Malawi is carried out by women, domestic labour is currently included in leisure. This means that women who engage in many hours of domestic work appear to have more leisure than they actually do.
As a result, their outside option of being single appears less attractive. If data on domestic labour were available, this would reduce women's leisure and make it more likely that some of them would prefer to be single. Table 4 shows the proportion of households that divorce between the 2010 an 2013 waves of the survey. While 1240 couples remain married, it is fair to say that the number of couples who split in this three-year period is relatively large, at 11.7% of the sample. There are some divorced households in 2013 where one of the spouses could not be re-interviewed; this is why the total number of divorced men or women with known marital status is fewer than the total number of divorced households. Of those women with known marital status in 2013, there is a fairly even share of single women and remarried women. On the other hand, most men divorce and remarry, with few remaining single. This is at odds with the assumption of frictions on the marriage market, which would imply that more men should become single rather than remarry between the two waves, and few women should divorce in order to be single.
Finally, Table 5 compares the characteristics of couples who divorce with those who do not. We …nd that both men and women who divorce have higher values of all instability indices in 2010, which suggests that these instability indices are capturing the returns to divorce. We will present a rigorous analysis of this relationship in Section 5.2. The table also shows that households who divorce have signi…cantly lower total consumption, fewer children and less land. Among couples who are still married, the household head is older, on average. This variable may be capturing marital duration, suggesting that couples who have been together longer are less likely to divorce (because they have weaker outside options, or because poor matches are dissolved early on). 19 
Divorce and economic gains
We start by presenting some regression results that shed light on which variables are correlated with our stability indices. Subsequently, we further analyze the relation between our indices and observed divorces in our Malawian data set. We will conclude that our structural measures of marital stability are signi…cantly related to observed divorces and remarriages. This indicates that divorce in Malawi is driven, at least partly, by economic motivations. Our empirical …ndings also provide out-of-sample validation of our structural model.
What drives instability?
In the …rst step of our empirical analysis, we examine how household characteristics can explain instability, in particular the BPmax and BPavg indices of men and women. We explore the e¤ect of characteristics such as the head's education level, the consumption quintile, landholdings and the distance to the nearest road and urban area. The consumption quintiles are dummy variables that equal one if the household's per capita consumption is in that bracket, and zero otherwise;
for example, the …fth quintile is a dummy variable equal to one if the household's per capita consumption is in the top 20% of the sample. As the dependent variables are censored below zero, we perform tobit regressions. We present the marginal e¤ect of covariates at the means of these covariates on the censored variable. Table 6 presents these results.
We …nd that the more educated the household head, the lower are the wife's BP indices (i.e.
her remarriage possibilities are less attractive). On the other hand, a secondary school educated household head leads to higher instability for the man, compared to no education. This pattern can be explained by the fact that most household heads are male, so that a highly educated man is a more attractive husband, both to his wife and to other women in the marriage market.
The results also show that wealthier households are more stable: this is captured by landholdings and the consumption quintile. Women, in particular, appear to be more maritally stable when their household owns more land, while being in the top consumption quintile has an especially signi…cant stabilizing e¤ect, as compared to being in the bottom consumption quintile (the excluded group). These results are consistent with the descriptive statistics in Table 5 , where households who divorce in the panel own less land and have lower consumption. Finally, we observe an e¤ect of connectedness on stability: the closer households are to the nearest road, the more unstable they are; this is true for both spouses. A one kilometer increase in the household's distance to the nearest road reduces the wife's BPmax (i.e. maximum consumption gain from remarriage as a percentage of household income) by 0:06 percentage points and the husband's by 0:02 percentage points. This may be because being more connected to other places makes it easier for spouses to widen their marriage market. 
Divorce
We now present the main empirical analysis. We examine whether our instability indices, estimated using 2010 data, can predict divorce in the following three years. We estimate a logit model of divorce between 2010 and 2013, with the BP indices of the spouses and the IR index of the husband as covariates. We do not include the wife's IR index because this measure does not not vary in our sample. In addition to the covariates in the regressions in Table 6 , we also include variables to measure religiousness in the village (the number of churches and the number of mosques), an additional measure of connectivity (access to a telephone in the village) and measures of match quality (the education, age and religion di¤erence of the spouses). Finally, we also include the size of the cluster as a control variable. The results are in Table 7 .
Interestingly, we …nd a signi…cant relationship between the instability indices from our structural model and subsequent divorce. In regression (1), a one-percentage-point increase in the wife's maximum gain from remarriage, as a proportion of her household's income, raises the probability of divorce by 0:6 percentage points on average. This is a non-negligible e¤ect, as the proportions of currently divorced and married individuals in the population suggest an annual divorce probability of approximately 8:5%. In regression (2), a one-percentage-point increase in the average remarriage gain for the wife, as a proportion of her household's income, raises divorce probability by 17:9
percentage points. Note that the impact of a percentage point change of the maximum and average gains from remarriage on the divorce probability are not directly comparable to each other since the base levels of the BPmax and BPavg are very di¤erent (see Table 3 ). The BPavg index of the husband also has a positive, signi…cant e¤ect on divorce probability, although the e¤ect is small in magnitude compared to that of the wife's BPavg index. Next, we …nd that the IR index of the man has a slightly negative, but statistically signi…cant, impact on divorce. This may seem surprising at …rst sight. However, as we will explain further on (when discussing Table 9 ), this negative e¤ect of the male's IR index disappears if we condition on wages, non-labour incomes and land incomes and, therefore, it may be regarded as mainly capturing an income e¤ect. Overall, these results suggest that our measures of instability are able to capture the gains to divorce, and that women in Malawi are more likely to divorce for economic reasons than men. These results validate our structural model.
Other covariates are also signi…cantly related to divorce. The probability of divorce is decreasing in the number of children, with an additional child reducing divorce probability by 1:4 percentage points. This implies that an approximately 2:3 percentage point reduction in the wife's maximum gain from remarriage, as a percentage of income, reduces divorce probability as much as an additional child. The probability of divorce is falling in the age of the household head, which may be because couples who are together longer are better matched, or because the value of outside options on the marriage market falls with age. We also …nd that divorce probability is decreasing in the household's wealth, as captured by the per capita consumption quintile. This is consistent with the descriptive statistics in Section 4. In villages with many mosques, divorce is less likely, while divorce is more likely in villages with a telephone, again suggesting that connectedness plays an It is worth noting that the absence of domestic labour cannot explain the signi…cant e¤ect of the wife's instability index on divorce. As domestic labour is currently included in leisure, marriages appear to be more attractive than they actually are. Consider a woman who engages in a lot of domestic labour: she appears to be stable, but at the same time is unhappy because she works hard, as a result of which she is more likely to divorce. An increase in domestic labour increases stability in our model but at the same time is likely to increase the probability of divorce. Therefore, it cannot explain the positive relationship between the instability indices and divorce probability.
Finally, our results cannot be explained by polygamy. The inclusion of a dummy for the existence of polygamy in the village does not a¤ect the signi…cant e¤ect of the wife's instability index on divorce, but we do …nd that the existence of polygamy increases the overall probability of divorce (results available on request).
Extensions
Multinomial model An important implication of the way that the instability indices are de…ned is that the BP index measures the attractiveness of a potential new match on the marriage market, while the IR index measures the attractiveness of being single. Therefore, we should observe these associations in the data as well. In order to explore this, we estimate a multinomial logit model for the marital status of husbands and wives in 2013, distinguishing between remarriage and being single. 9 We retain the same right-hand side variables as in Table 7 and set remaining married as the base case. The results are in Table 8 , which reports relative risk ratios (exponentiated coe¢ cients). 10 The results are consistent with the premise that the BP indices measure the attractiveness of remarriage. In particular, a higher value of the husband's BP index is signi…cantly associated with a higher probability that the husband divorces and remarries in the next three years, instead of remaining married. The e¤ect of the wife's BP index is stronger and is signi…cantly associated with the remarriage of both the husband and the wife. This result is consistent with the observation that in Malawi, men …nd it easy to remarry. A one percentage point increase in the wife's maximum remarriage gain, as a proportion of household income, raises the relative risk of both the husband and wife divorcing and remarrying, relative to remaining married, by a factor of 1:1. Neither the wife's nor the husband's BP index raises the odds of divorcing and being single, relative to staying married; this is encouraging, as blocking pairs relate speci…cally to potential remarriage partners and should not be related to individuals divorcing in order to be single. Therefore, the BP indices Other signi…cant e¤ects persist from Table 7 : the odds of a woman divorcing and remarrying are declining in the number of children, as are the odds that a man divorces and remains single. The number of mosques has a signi…cant negative e¤ect on the odds that the man divorces and remarries, as well as the odds that the woman divorces and remains single. The presence of a telephone in the village increases the odds of remarriage for both the husband and wife but, interestingly, has no e¤ect on the odds that either spouse is single. This supports the idea that the telephone captures some of the ability of spouses to learn about their marriage market. Finally, a higher consumption quintile of the household is broadly associated with lower odds of divorce for the wife, consistent with the results in Table 7 , which showed that wealthier households are less likely to divorce.
Can the e¤ect of instability be explained by wages or income? The results so far suggest that individuals, and particularly women, in Malawi divorce for economic reasons and that our instability indices capture these economic reasons well. However, one might argue that the BP index does not capture the economic gains from divorce, but rather is entirely driven by one or more of its components from equation (8) in Section 2.3. In order to explore this possibility, we introduce these components as explanatory variables to regressions (1) and (2) in Table 7 . In particular, we include the average wage of the husband and wife, the di¤erence between these wages, the average non-labour income of the spouses, its di¤erence, as well as the average land income, its di¤erence, and the log of total income. All of these variables are the product of the estimation discussed in Section 2.4. The results are in Table 9 .
The key result is that the coe¢ cients on the BP indices in this table are not signi…cantly di¤erent from those in the regressions in Table 7 . In other words, the e¤ect of our instability index cannot be explained simply by di¤erences in wages, non-labour income or land income of the spouses. These variables do seem to explain the negative impact of the IR index of the man, however, indicating that this index is mainly capturing an income e¤ect. As such we can conclude that the BP indices are able to capture a more complex form of gains from divorce that likely includes intrahousehold sharing of consumption, which is an important determinant of the BP indices in the model. Finally, we …nd that the average wage and the non-labour income of the household have a signi…cant decreasing e¤ect on the probability of divorce, beyond any indirect e¤ect through the BP indices. Presumably, this is because they increase the gains to the current marriage. The same conclusion does not hold for land income and total income, but note that the impact of these variables is rather small compared to all the other variables.
Heterogeneous e¤ects
We have shown that spouses' BP indices are signi…cantly associated with divorce, that this result holds in a multinomial model and that it cannot be explained by the components of the BP indices from the structural model. This relationship may mask signi…cant heterogeneity, and this is what we explore here. We focus on the most attractive remarriage possibility (BPmax ) and we include some new variables in the logit model of Table 7 , such as landholdings and the sex ratio (de…ned as the ratio of males over females in a given cluster), as well as explore heterogeneity in existing explanatory variables, namely age of the household head and number of children. Table 10 shows these results.
In regression (1), we …nd that the signi…cant e¤ect of BPmax on divorce only holds when the household has positive landholdings, and is increasing in these landholdings. For a household that owns two acres of land, which are the average landholdings in our sample, an increase in the wife's
BPmax of one percentage point increases the probability of divorce by 0:6 percentage points, which is comparable to the e¤ect in Table 7 . The result also makes intuitive sense: land provides security on divorce, so spouses without land may …nd it too economically risky to divorce.
Next, we consider the interaction between age and the BPmax indices. Regression (2) shows that the wife's BPmax index is still a signi…cant predictor of divorce, but this e¤ect is declining in the age of the household head. This may be for two reasons: …rst, age may be a proxy for marital duration, and assuming match quality is revealed over time, spouses may be less driven by economic incentives later on in marriage. Second, age may tell us something about the individual's outside
options. An older divorcée may have lower chances on the remarriage market than a younger divorcée, all other things equal, so that she may be less likely to respond to attractive outside options.
In the baseline regressions in Table 7 , children always reduce the probability of divorce. In regression (3), we …nd that this is especially true for men: high remarriage gains for the husband are less likely to result in divorce if the couple has more children. This is also true for the wife, although the e¤ect is not statistically signi…cant. Finally, in regression (4) we examine the interaction between the sex ratio and the e¤ect of blocking pairs on divorce. For a sex ratio equal to one, an increase in the wife's BPmax index of one percentage point increases the probability of divorce by approximately 1:6 percentage points. The more men there are, relative to women, the stronger the e¤ect of the wife's potential gains from remarriage on divorce probability. This is a rational response: if there are more men relative to women in the population, the likelihood of a pro…table remarriage is greater.
Conclusion
We have de…ned structural measures of the gains from divorce and shown that they are signi…cant predictors of future divorces. These measures are based on a collective model with consumption and agricultural production embedded in a marriage market. The key theoretical contribution is that we extend Cherchye, Demuynck, De Rock and Vermeulen (2015) to include agricultural production, allowing the estimation of shadow wages and land prices. The model yields marital stability conditions for each married individual. Using these conditions, we can quantify marital instability in terms of Individual Rationality (IR) and Blocking Pair (BP ) indices, which capture We estimate our model on the 2010 wave of the Malawi Integrated Household Survey, and correlate our instability indices with divorce in the next three years of the panel data set. We …nd that a 1 percentage point increase in the wife's BP index as a proportion of her household income increases divorce probability by 0:6 percentage points in the next three years. This result is robust to using an average BP or most attractive BP index, as well as to the estimation of a more general multinomial model. We also show that this result cannot be explained by the wages or land income of the spouses, implying that intrahousehold sharing matters.
Our …ndings lead us to conclude that divorce in Malawi is driven, at least partly, by economic considerations of spouses, with consumption sharing within households as an important determinant. In addition, our empirical results validate the set-up of our theoretical model. More generally, they show the value-added of adopting a Beckerian approach that analyzes marriage decisions through the lens of a structural model of household decision making. Finally, as agricultural productivity is a key determinant of outside options in developing countries reliant on agriculture, our model is applicable to other contexts as well, where accurate data on wages or land prices may not be available.
remaining age of the item as twice the mean age of this item in the sample minus its current age, with a minimum of two years. The annual consumption stream from each item was the amount of money the item could be sold for, if sold today, divided by the remaining age of the item. The cost of hired labour was calculated as the number of days this labour was used times the average daily wage for these labourers, as reported by the household. The survey distinguished between male, female and child labourers, providing a more accurate measure of the total cost. Free labour was also valued at these rates and included as a costly input.
Revenue The revenue was calculated as the sum of all crop sales during the rainy and dry seasons and the value of all own agricultural production that was consumed by the household.
The latter value originates from the survey itself, where households were asked how much of each consumed food they had grown themselves. This was then valued at local prices by the World Bank Living Standards Measurement Study team. 11
Consumption
Consumption was split into four categories: public consumption; private non-assignable consumption; private consumption of the man and private consumption of the woman.
Public consumption
This included expenditure on children's education and health, expenditure on the education and health of other household members (not the husband or wife), expenditure on children's clothing, expenditure on durables (which was calculated as a use value or consumption stream, using the same method described for machinery above), expenditure on public nondurables (such as candles, light bulbs and books), expenditure on rent and expenditure on public bills (such as …rewood and the landline telephone).
Private non-assignable consumption The largest component of private non-assignable consumption was food, consisting of food purchased, the value of food from own production and the value of food received as a gift. This category also included private bills (such as the mobile telephone) and private nondurables (such as cigarettes, tickets for public transport, soap and stationery items).
Private consumption of the man and woman This consisted of the health, education and clothing expenses of the man or woman.
Time
The model requires two time variables: agricultural labour and leisure.
Agricultural labour Agricultural labour was calculated as the total number of hours of agricultural work on the household's plots in the rainy and dry seasons of the past year, reported by the husband or wife. Where certain information was missing, such as the individual reported the number of days worked but not the number of hours per day, we used the village median for this information, where there were at least seven observations in the village. Otherwise, we used the district median.
Leisure In order to calculate leisure hours, we …rst required a measure of total available hours.
As reported working hours are fairly low, leading to likely overestimates of true leisure time, we calculated total time available as the number of hours worked by the hardest working man or woman in the sample in the past year. This included both agricultural and wage labour and resulted in a value of 6120 hours. We assumed that this hardest worker works full-time and has zero leisure.
We then calculated leisure for each individual as 6120 minus the annual hours of agricultural and wage labour of each individual.
Landholdings
In order to accurately measure the land income of individuals on divorce, we required exact information on the amount of land owned by each spouse. We de…ned land to be owned if it was inherited, granted by local leaders, part of a bride price, purchased with a title or purchased without a title. Land that was owned either solely by the spouse or owned by the spouse jointly with someone outside the household was assumed to accrue to that spouse on divorce. Land not owned by either spouse was assumed to disappear after divorce, while land owned jointly by the spouses was allowed to be endogenously split in the simulations.
Covariates in regressions
Here we explain how the covariates in the regressions were de…ned. All covariates from the data are from the 2010 wave. The 2013 wave was only used to see whether the couple had divorced.
# Children This is the number of own or adopted children living in the household. Age of head This is the age of the household head; the identity of the head was self-reported in the data.
Consumption quintiles

